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▪ We issue a BUY recommendation, considering our YE-
19 PT of $68,58. If we include the dividends expected for the year 
of 2019 ($1,45 per share), this represents a total shareholder 
return of 31%. 
▪ The year of 2018 has represented a certain paradox for 
Tyson: with some of the best results ever, stock performance has 
disappointed, with a 34% drop in the last twelve months, 
underperforming the S&P 500 index. 
▪ Key Opportunities: Maximize synergies leveraging on its 
vast distribution network and client base; Keep up the pace in 
product and process innovation to modernize its legacy brands 
and develop new ones; Assume the trendsetter role in the industry 
fostering development of alternative meat and disruptive business 
models. 
▪ Key Risks: Unfavourable input cost variations fluctuations; 
Trump Trade War and access to export markets; Overestimation of 
acquisition synergies. 
▪ Valuation: our PT is modelled using DCF methodology in 
order to obtain the company’s intrinsic value, with a WACC of 
5,9% and a PGR of 1,7%. The positive outlook is mostly confirmed 
by the alternative valuation method we applied. 
Company description 
Founded in 1935, Tyson Foods is the U.S. leader in protein. With 
more than 120 thousand employees the company processes 
feeder cattle, life hogs and broiler flock into finished products. In 
the Prepared Foods segment, it operates under multiple, market 
leading brands, such as Jimmy Dean, Hillshire and BallPark, 
producing value-added frozen and refrigerated food products. 
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(Values in $ millions) 2017 2018 2019F 
Revenues 38,260 40.052 41.177 
   Growth %, YoY 3,7 4,7 2,8 
EBITDA 3,648 4.021 3,676 
   Margin % 9,5 10,0 8,9 
Net Income (Loss) 1.778 3,027 1.742 
   Margin % 4,2 7,6 4,2 
EPS ($) 4,79 8,19 4,72 
   Growth %, YoY 5,7 71,0 -42,4 
Source: Company report, Analysts Estimates. 
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Valuation summary | Tyson Foods, Inc.
Tyson Foods DCF Valuation 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 Perp
($ millions) Historical Financials Forecasted Financials
Free Cash Flows Calculation
Total Revenue 32.266 33.055 34.374 37.580 41.373 36.881 38.260 40.052 41.177 41.276 42.014 42.806 43.294 43.703 44.223 44.702 45.395 46.062
y/y Growth- % 10,1% -10,9% 3,7% 4,7% 2,8% 0,2% 1,8% 1,9% 1,1% 0,9% 1,2% 1,1% 1,6% 1,5% -100,0%
EBIT 1.278 1.255 1.357 1.429 2.158 2.861 2.941 3.079 2.702 2.736 2.743 2.684 2.740 2.845 2.904 2.980 2.989 2.995
EBIT Margin 4,0% 3,8% 3,9% 3,8% 5,2% 7,8% 7,7% 7,7% 6,6% 6,6% 6,5% 6,3% 6,3% 6,5% 6,6% 6,7% 6,6% 6,5% 6,5%
Operating Taxes 434 330 542 (1.449) 823 873 535 683 2.336 723 729 726 720 739 763 780 795 797
NOPLAT 844 925 815 2.878 1.335 1.988 2.406 2.396 366 2.013 2.014 1.958 2.020 2.106 2.141 2.200 2.194 2.198
Depreciations and Amortizations 506 499 519 520 701 697 748 933 974 965 967 984 1.003 1.014 1.024 1.036 1.047 1.063
Changes in Working Capital - (273) 30 (113) 202 358 (125) (241) 111 (5) (46) (52) (28) (21) (30) (555) (51) (49)
Capex - (677) (570) (11.539) (600) (609) (4.960) (2.465) (1.304) (1.020) (1.379) (1.427) (1.275) (1.243) (1.314) (1.303) (1.434) (1.436)
Changes in other assets (41) 17 (57) 286 109 55 23 (26) (187) (28) (20) (20) (23) (24) (23) (23) (21) (21)
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 1.309 491 737 (7.968) 1.747 2.489 (1.908) 597 (40) 1.924 1.535 1.444 1.697 1.832 1.798 1.354 1.735 1.755 1.755
Date factor (year-end) - 0,8 1,8 2,8 3,8 4,8 5,8 6,8 7,8 8,8
Discount factor 100,0% 95,7% 90,3% 85,2% 80,5% 75,9% 71,7% 67,6% 63,8% 60,3%
% of year remaining       0% 76% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PV of UFCF n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - 1.402 1.387 1.231 1.365 1.391 1.288 916 1.108 1.057
Assumptions
Price target date dez/19
WACC, % 5,9%
PGR, % 1,7%
Valuation @ YE2019 USDm %
Sum of PV of UFCF 11.145,5 30,5%
PV of terminal value 25.440,0 69,5%
Value of Operations 36.585,4 100,0%
Excess cash and marketable securities 114,8
Nonconsolidated investments 244,3
Other financial assets -
Tax loss carryforwards -
Enterprise value 36.944,5
Short-term debt 723,7
Long-term debt 9.387,5
Postretirement benefit liabilities, net of assets 304,8
Other nonoperating provisions -
Value of outstading options -
Noncontrollig interests 8,0
Equity value 26.520,5
Weighted Average Fully Dilluted Shares, million 369,0
Equity Value per share 71,9
Scenario Analysis % $
Downward Scenario 20 54,2
Base Scenario 70 71,9
Upward Scenario 10 74,4
Scenario weighted average price 100 68,6
71,9 0,7% 1,2% 1,7% 2,2% 2,7%
4,9% 78 89 102 121 148
5,4% 67 75 85 98 116
5,9% 58 64 72 81 94
6,4% 51 56 61 69 78
6,9% 44 48 53 59 66
W
ac
c,
 %
PGR, %Value 
Exhibit 1: DCF Valuation Summary 
Source: Company reports, Analysts estimates. 
Our buy recommendation has an underlying target price of $68,6 for year-end 2019, yielding a 
total return of 31,3% in one year’s time.  
We consider the Discounted Cash Flow method to be the most comprehensive depiction of the drivers of 
intrinsic value. Exhibit 1, depicts a summary of the main captions driving DCF value in our base case. 
The Unlevered Cash Flow resulting from our operating assumptions is discounted at a WACC of 5,9%, 
and we apply a perpetual growth rate of 1,7%. At the end of this report a Football field is presented with 
the results of the alternative valuation methods, used to triangulate the DCF analysis. 
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Company overview 
Company description 
Tyson Foods, Inc. (TSN) is the biggest protein company in the U.S. and one of 
the largest food companies worldwide. Founded in 1935 by John W. Tyson, it 
started its activity by trading chickens in national markets. As time went by, the 
small family business started to grow through acquisitions along its supply chain 
as well as through internationalization. However, it was only in the 21st century 
that Tyson started to experience substantial growth whit the acquisition of IBP, a 
beef and pork processor. This decision was the cornerstone in making Tyson a 
truly diversified company. Nowadays, the company employs 121.000 employees 
across the globe, 116.000 of which in the U.S. and operates mainly in four 
reportable segments: Chicken, Pork, Beef and Prepared Foods. In its wide 
product portfolio, it is offered primal and sub-primal meat cuts; case ready 
chicken, beef and pork; fully cooked meats and value-added frozen and 
refrigerated food products (branded). The first three business units described 
above sell its production mainly as commodities (meat). Prepared Foods, sells its 
value-added products under recognised brands, including 9 market leaders such 
as Tyson, Jimmy Dean (2 products), Hillshire Farm (2 Products), Ball Park, 
Wright, Aidells and State Fair. Overall the company has around 42 registered 
brands, most of them acquired throughout the years. 
Tyson main clients are food retailers, foodservice distributors, restaurant 
operators, hotel chains and non-commercial foodservice establishments, as well 
as 125 countries worldwide being NAFTA, Central America, China, Hong Kong, 
Japan and South Korea its major international clients representing around 65% of 
the total international sales, depicted in Exhibit 8. 
The group’s revenue grew 4,7% in 2018 and 3,7% in 2017 reaching an all-time 
record of $40 billion (excluding 2015 when the sales reached $41 billion due to 
the integration of the results coming from the Hillshire Brands acquisition, later 
adjusted) compared to a growth of 1,2% in 2017 and of 1,9% in 2018 of the 
broad F&B industry1. Furthermore, it can be observed in Exhibit 2 the increasing 
importance of the Prepared Foods segment in total revenues which shows the 
strategic shift from commodities to more value-added products, with higher 
margins. In Exhibit 3 it is also possible to confirm this conclusion, seeing that the 
share of sales coming from consumer products have been increasing in contrast 
                                                 
1 Analysts Estimations based on Bloomberg data 
Exhibit 2: Sales Evolution by 
Segment, % of Total Revenues 
Source: Company Fact Book 2017. 
Exhibit 3:  Sales Evolution by 
Distribution Channel 
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
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with the decreasing of food services (commodities). This strategic shift will be 
further discussed in the Strategic Analysis of this report. 
Ownership structure and governance 
As of January 2019, Tyson had a dual-class  share system with Class A 
representing the floating stock, and Class B being mostly held by Tyson’s family 
members. Holders of Class B stock have the right to convert such stock into 
Class A stock on a share-for-share basis. Furthermore, holders of Class B stock 
are entitled to 10 votes per share and holders of Class A stock are entitled to one 
vote per share. In October 2018, there were approximately 21.000 holders of 
Class A stock and 6 holders of Class B stock. There are approximately 5x more 
Class A shares than Class B shares17.  
This ownership structure allows the Tyson family trough the rights over Tyson 
Limited Partnership (TLP), which owns 99.985% of the outstanding Class B 
shares, to have only 2,09% of the outstanding Class A shares and at the same 
time control 70,96% of the company’s total voting rights. Therefore, as a 
consequence of these holdings, the Tyson Family including Mr. John Tyson, 
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Ms. Barbara Tyson, a director of the 
Company, to have the ability to exercise significant influence over the company’s 
management decisions and all matters needful of action by the stockholders. 
This concentration of ownership may interfere with a change in control favourable 
to other stockholders (Class A) and could negatively impact Tyson Foods stock 
price. For this, investors are likely to price Tyson stock at a discount out of fear 
for the lack of control, specially under periods of high degree of uncertainty as it 
is happening in the U.S. right now.  
CEO replacement 
In September 2018 Tyson Foods announced the replacement of its CEO Tom 
Hays, who had been on the role for only two years, by its formerly group 
president of Beef, Pork and International, Noel White. The company alleged 
personal reasons for the mentioned replacement2. However, it is believed that 
the dropdown of more than 30%1 on the stock price recorded in the FY 2018 was 
the real reason behind this decision. The board chose a “veteran” with high 
influence on the company’s international business to make a statement on 
Tyson’s future international focus. In the recent past the strategic focus was on 
sales of packaged and prepared foods, which didn’t yield the desired outcomes. 
Regardless of this change, the stock continued its free fall until the end of the 
year as the international panorama remains highly unpredictable. 
                                                 
2 Tyson Investor Relations Website, News, 17 Sep 2018 
Exhibit 5:  Ownership vs Control  
Exhibit 4:  Stock division by 
share class, % of 369M shares 
Exhibit 6:  Operating Margin 
Evolution  
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
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Core strategy 
In a well consolidated food and beverage industry with low growth, as in the 
United States, the most efficient way of sustaining growth is through acquisitions 
or through global expansion. During 2018 first three quarters alone, there were 
157 transactions in the industry, 40% of which by Tyson’s direct related parties3. 
 As we can see in Exhibit 6, Tyson’s operating margins have more than doubled 
in the last 5 years, mainly due to heavy M&A activity in companies specialized on 
sales of packaged and prepared foods, which have higher profit margins than 
raw meat. The observed growth relies namely on the 2014 Hillshire Brands 
acquisition. Likewise, prepared Foods operating margins range between 10%-
12% compared with 3%-5% for beef/pork and around 8% for chicken17.  
Tyson strategic goal is to achieve market leading positions for their brands or 
acquire brands in identified high growth target markets for value-added products 
to take advantage of concentrated production, sales and marketing efforts so 
they can enhance demand from those markets and utilize their distribution and 
customer support systems to quickly adapt to customer specific needs. In the 
Exhibit 9 we can observe the company´s success in the past year regarding the 
implementation of such strategy. 
Moreover, Mr. Tyson himself said on the CEO replacement2 conference that the 
company wants to continue to expand in to new product categories and maintain 
the focus on global growth, innovation, value-added capabilities and customer 
partnerships to drive long-term value. Coupled with this, we expect the firm to 
continue the investments in M&A that boost their higher margin segment as it 
happened in 2017 with the acquisition of AdvancePierre and with acquisitions 
that enhance global expansion as it happened with the purchase of Keystone 
Foods in 2018. However, we do not believe that this strategic shift to the higher 
margin segment will outweigh Tyson’s commodity businesses. At the same time, 
we do not attribute the same amount of confidence in the international expansion 
as the company does. Taking a closer look into the evolution of international 
sales (Exhibit 8), it is possible to conclude that despite Tyson past efforts and the 
growth in the company’s overall sales, this class of sales have fell (Exhibit 2). 
One should also bear in mind that international sales from goods produced 
abroad decreased in the past years which mirrors the struggle that the company 
has in producing abroad since they can’t leverage their domestic competitive 
advantages in the foreign landscape. 
                                                 
3 Source: “Food and Beverage, Merger & Acquisitions overview”, Capstone Headwaters (2018) 
Exhibit 7: Major Strategic 
Acquisitions, in billion U.S. $ 
Exhibit 8: Tyson Foods 
International Sales Evolution, in 
billion U.S. $ 
 
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
Source: Company 10-K Reports. 
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Nevertheless, 90% of the increase in protein consumption is going to come from 
outside the U.S.4 in the long run. The acquisition of Keystone, a leading provider 
of chicken, beef, fish and pork to the growing global foodservice industry such as 
Asia Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East and Africa5, gives the sign that the 
company wants to follow this international growth as previously mentioned. 
However, taking in consideration the company’s track record performance in 
foreign markets and the instability verified in the U.S. trade policies (later 
analysed in higher detail), it is still early to say if this acquisition will pay off. 
Sector Overview 
Within the broad food and beverage sector, Tyson operates in two very distinct 
segments: beef, pork and chicken production, which are largely commodities, 
where the main source of competitive advantage are operating efficiencies, and 
the revenue is driven by market demand; and the prepared food market, where 
brand awareness and values are relevant for customer buying decisions and 
operating margins. 
Market size and growth 
The commodity business is favoured by an increasing demand 
Worldwide demand for meat has sharply increased over the last decades, with 
the meat production growing from 80 million in 1968 to more than 300 million 
tons (Mt.) in 2018, according to FAO data. This trend is expected to continue in 
the foreseeable future, fuelled by an increasing demand mainly from the growing 
middle classes in developing countries, with projections showing and increase in 
global per capital meat consumption to 35,4 kg, up from 34,3 kg in 20176. 
Furthermore, declines in mortality rates surpassing declines in birth rates in 
developing countries and an overall increase in life expectancy leads to a global 
increase in the world population, which is expected to reach 8,5 billion people by 
20307, increasing this way the number of consumers of meat worldwide. 
Meat production is expected to expand by 48 Mt. until 2027, but the 
production growth is concentrated: developing countries account for 76% of 
the total increase in worldwide meat production, and poultry is the main driver, 
accounting for 44% of the growth. More than half of the mentioned increase is 
expected to be attributed to China, the U.S. and Brazil. 
                                                 
4 Q4 2018 Earnings Call Presentation 
5 Investor Presentation, Keystone Acquisition, August 2018 
6 Source: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook. 
7 Source: “Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios Analysis”, World Economic Forum (2017). 
Exhibit 9:  Prepared Foods Retail 
Volume Performance, Top 10 F&B 
Branded Companies 
Source: IRI Total U.S. Multi-Outlet, Volume 
Sales 52 weeks ending 12/31/2017. 
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Drivers of industry growth are strongly influenced by environmental 
legislation: the availability of natural resources and the possibilities of increases 
in productivity are the only long-term constraints to livestock production growth, 
and both are dependent on the regulatory framework put in place. 
Adverse shocks can take a significant toll in the industry: trade disputes, like 
the meat import ban put in place by the Russian Federation as a response to the 
economic sanctions, animal disease outbreaks, e.g. swine fever, or extreme 
climate events, such as droughts or floods, have shown the volatility the industry 
faces. These events are largely unpredictable, and their effects tend to be 
regionally contained and have a short- to medium-term impact. 
The U.S. market: stagnation, a (very) high level 
The United States have one of the highest per capita meat consumptions in the 
world, with 99,5 kg.8 in 2018. However, per capita meet consumption is expected 
to remain stable from 2018 onwards in all the major meat categories, according 
to estimates by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Conversely, 
meat production levels are also expected to remain stable. 
The pricing game: input prices vs. supply-demand dynamics 
Research shows that commodity prices are tightly linked to the respective 
production (see Exhibit 10), which in this industry is translated mainly by the 
meat-to-feed price ratio (Exhibit 13). As depicted in Exhibit 12, these input costs 
tend to be very volatile. However, input costs are not the only relevant variable in 
play, as changing profit dynamics create incentives to increase or decrease 
production, which leads to situations of over-demand or over-supply. As a result, 
price fluctuations are considerable, and double-digit YoY variations are not a rare 
occasion. Real prices are expected to follow the downward trend initiated in 
2012, particularly in beef, reflecting the rapid herd rebuilding in North America 
and the vast supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Includes Red meat and poultry. 
Exhibit 10:  Bloomberg commodity 
returns vs. production cost 
Source: Core Commodity. 
Exhibit 13:  Feed cost index and meat to feed price ratios 
Source: FAO-OECD Agricultural Outlook 
2017-26. (left)  
Source: USDA, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, IMF. (up) 
Exhibit 12:  Evolution of selected 
input costs, Index (2011=100) 
Exhibit 11:  U.S. per capita meat 
consumption evolution, by category 
Source: USDA. 
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Changing consumer preferences boost the prepared foods market 
Processed meat and seafood is a $36,2 billion segment of the global packaged 
food industry (worth $2,4 trillion)9. It is experiencing a considerable growth 
momentum, displaying a CAGR of 2,3% (2004-18) and a forecasted annual 
growth of 2,9% until 2023, as more people around the world – particularly in 
developed countries and in younger generations – seek to reduce the hassle of 
meal preparation, making convenience an area of opportunity. Within the 
segment, meat substitutes is, by far, the category with the highest growth (Exhibit 
15), and even though its growth impetus is expected to slow down, it should 
remain the segment’s top performer. 
Competitive landscape 
There is fierce rivalry and a heavy regulatory burden in the Food and Beverage 
industry. Even though corporate consolidation is a reality in the industry, with a 
few big players generally concentrating more than half of the market share in the 
various sub-segments, the commodity segment’s low switching costs and a very 
homogeneous product, yield a low customer loyalty. In the brand and value-
added segment, niche producers and substitutes are increasingly playing a 
relevant role and threatening incumbents’ positions. In both segments, the norm 
is some concentration of distribution channels, with a small number of buyers 
representing big customer accounts.  
Tyson Foods is a leading player in all its reportable segments, being the number 
one player in Beef, Chicken, and Prepared Foods10. Exhibit 16 details the most 
relevant competitors in each of Tyson’s business unit. 
                                                 
9 Source: Passport “Processed meat and seafood in the US” (Nov/18) and “World market for packaged food” (Nov/18) 
10 Considers the Processed Meat and Seafood sub-category. 
Exhibit 15:  Estimated CAGR of 
Processed Meat and Seafood 
Industry in the U.S., 2018-23. 
Source: Passport Euromonitor 
International. 
Exhibit 16:  Tyson Foods market 
shares in its business segments 
Exhibit 14:  Processed U.S. meat 
and seafood market, $ billions 
 
Source: Passport Euromonitor 
International. 
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Relevant trends 
Three main trends are identifiable in the industry: 
1. Healthy and sustainable eating: there is increased awareness of 
consumers for the environmental issues associated with meat production, is 
pushing the higher end of the value tier of the market. An increasing number 
of consumers are willing to pay price premiums for products they consider 
beneficial for their health, e.g. in 2016, 68% of consumers were willing to pay 
more for products that do not contain undesired ingredients (up 26% from 
2015)11. Moreover, meat substitution is already one of the fastest growing 
categories in the processed food and seafood industry9. 
2. Convenient, personalized and transparent eating: consumers are looking 
for food that meets their own nutrition and health needs, with the least 
amount of hassle possible in the preparation process, being willing to pay in 
order to avoid spending unnecessary time; it is estimated that by 2020, 58% 
of meal orders is done via dedicated online platforms11. Sourcing and 
traceability are also gaining relevance, with customers starting to ask more 
questions about their food, and demanding production disclosures. 
3. Experiential eating: more than three out of four millennials say they prefer 
to spend money on desirable experiences than things12; not surprisingly, in 
the age of the experience economy, the act of eating is no longer reduced to 
the satisfaction of a physiological need but is seen as a form of cultural self-
expression and exploration. Brands that are consumed passively in “auto-
pilot” risk losing their identity. 
To cope with these new trends Tyson had created a venture capital fund in the 
Fall of 2016 (Tyson New Ventures LLC). It aims to invest “in companies 
developing breakthrough technologies, business models and products to 
sustainably feed the growing world population”. With a commitment of $150 
million from Tyson, its investments rotate around two core pillars of Sustainability, 
and the Internet of Food – see Exhibit 17. Even though these seed stage 
investments in start are marginal for the company, they allow Tyson to be on top 
of potential paradigm shifts in the industry. 
One of the fund’s most disruptive investments is Future Meat Technologies, 
which is focused on the production of lab-grown meat, i.e. real meat grown from 
                                                 
11 Source: “Have you met the new consumer?”, Deloitte 2017 (content in Portuguese). 
12 Source: “Millennials: Fueling the Experience Economy”, Eventbride (2014). 
Exhibit 17:  Tyson New Ventures 
fund strategy 
Source: Company data. 
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cells in the lab, without any actual animals being part of the process. The first lab-
meat burger was “grown” in at Maastricht University, back in the year of 2013, by 
Professor Mark Post, but the method is still far too expensive to be viable for 
mass production. If successful, this idea would considerably reduce the 
environmental costs of meat production and could help cover the increasing 
demand generated by the growing middle class in developing countries. 
Financial and operating performance 
Relevant competitors 
Considering the size and diversified business of Tyson Foods, no company can 
be considered a direct comparable. The company selects 14 companies13 as 
peer group to benchmark its stock market performance. Even though this 
selection may be reasonable for the purposes of stock benchmarking, companies 
as Coca-Cola or Kellog have no evident correlation with Tyson’s operations. 
Henceforth, we prepare two peer groups for the purposes of our valuation: 
1. Close Peers: group of companies with closest ties in operations to Tyson, 
used to benchmark operational and financial performance. List of selected 
companies and a short description bellow. 
2. Adjusted Bloomberg Peers: companies with levels of growth and ROIC 
closest with Tyson out of Bloomberg’s selected comparables, as we will 
further elaborate in the Valuation section. 
The companies considered in our Close Peers are Hormel Foods, Pilgrim's Pride, 
Sanderson Farms, and JBS: 
Hormel Foods Corp.: producing and marketing branded consumer foods 
worldwide, mainly focusing on meat derivates (pork, chicken, beef and lamb). 
With 20 thousand employees in 2017 this company’s size is a fraction of Tyson, 
we chose this company given the strong relation between its operations, not only 
to the prepared foods unit, but also to the others as they too involve meat input 
processing. 
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.: producing one in every five chickens in the U.S.14, this 
JBS subsidiary (current JBS stake is 78,5%15), is one of the world’s largest 
poultry producers. We find this company relevant, as it also encompasses the 
                                                 
13 Company defined peer group: Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, Bunge Limited, Campbell Soup Company, ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., General Mills, Inc., Hormel Foods Corp., Kellogg Co., Kraft Heinz Company, Mondelez International Inc., 
PepsiCo, Inc., Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, The Coca-Cola Company, The Hershey Company and The J.M. Smucker 
Company. 
14 Source: Company information. 
15 Source: Pilgrim’s 10-Q SEC filling, November 1st, 2018. 
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whole chicken value chain, from hatchery to distribution of fresh, frozen and 
value-added chicken products. 
Sanderson Farms, Inc.: integrated poultry processing company, produces, 
processes, markets, and distributes fresh, frozen, and prepared chicken products 
in the United States. We consider its strategic focus on natural production, with 
no additives or artificial ingredients, and operating efficiency to be best practice in 
the industry. 
JBS S.A.: the largest meet processing company in the world, processing beef, 
chicken and pork it is the company most closely resembling Tyson, which is why 
we decided to include it in this selection. Notwithstanding, one needs to exercise 
caution when establishing direct comparisons, as it is a Brazilian-based 
company, which falls under a different regulatory environment, and naturally has 
a different cost structure. Any non-operating comparisons lack meaningful 
insight, given the difference in country-risk premiums between the U.S. and Brazil 
and the volatility of the Brazilian real. 
Performance analysis and benchmarking 
Operating metrics 
Tyson’s revenues have grown at an average of 3,1% since 2011, which is a high 
value for a mature industry. High volatility in the annual variations, confirms the 
expectation that acquisitions and disposals are the greatest driver of this 
evolution. The operating margins have had an increasing trend in the last years 
but remain below the Close Peer average as we can see in the chart below. The 
Cost of Sales as % of Revenue has decreased from 92% to 85% from 2011 to 
2018, mainly due to decreasing input costs, such as corn, soybean and fuel as 
well as from realized synergies from the Hillshire acquisition in 2014.  
 
 
 
 
The 
Exhibit 18: COGS evolution in 
percentage of sales 
Source: Company 10-K. 
Exhibit 19: Operating Margin evolution, % 
Source: Company data, Analysts Estimates. 
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operating profit per employee has been increasing, reaching $26 thousand in 
2017, only surpassed by Hormel Foods ($61 thousand). This evidence seems to 
justify recent layoffs16, in as far as employee efficiency may apparently be 
improved. As such, we expect this metric to further increase in the future, 
particularly as the full potential of smart farming gets unleashed and new 
technologies get incorporated in the production process. 
Activity efficiency 
Cash management is vital for any company operating in the food and beverage 
industry. Overall, Tyson’s Cash Conversion Cycle has been deteriorating in the 
last years, from 26 to 32 days. Even so, it is still one of the best values in the 
Close Peer group, only surpassed by JBS, which has been seeing a remarkable 
improvement in the recent past. The main drivers for this efficiency are the 
Average Collection Period and the Average Inventory Holding Period which are 
below average, even though the later has been deteriorating significantly in the 
last years. On the other hand, the Average Payable Period has been historically 
below industry practices, pointing towards a difficulty from Tyson to get 
favourable payment terms from its suppliers.  
 
 
Capital structure 
Tyson’s net debt has increased almost fourfold between 2009 and 2018, 
reaching record $9,8 Billion in 2017, due to the mainly debt financed M&A 
activity. In relative terms this evolution is less significant, as Net Debt to Equity 
increasing 1,4 times over the same time period. Moreover, Net Debt to EBITDA is 
moving closer to the desired value of 2,0x EBITDA. Since a bad year does not 
survive a bad financial policy, we believe there to be some risk if, due to an 
                                                 
16 The Financial Fitness Program encompasses the elimination of 550 positions across several areas and job levels. 
Exhibit 20: Cash conversion cycle, days 
Source: Company data, Analysts Estimates. 
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economic downturn, hidden liabilities, or others, revenues fall short of 
expectations, which could easily put the company in breach of covenants, or lead 
to a downgrade of its credit worthiness, restricting access to the financial markets 
and tampering future growth prospects. In fact, of the analysed benchmark, only 
JBS had higher levels of debt. Thus, good liquidity management is key to 
minimize the inherent risks of the pursued strategy. Even so, the company has 
constantly maintained investment grade on its debt, with a “BBB” Standard & 
Poor’s17. Furthermore, the company always showed the ability to repay is debt 
and it generates enough cash to cover its obligations (see Exhibit 26). 
 
The investment case 
We believe that Tyson’s corporate strategy is aligned with the main trends in the 
Food industry, and that the company is in a leading position to seize its latent 
opportunities. In our assessment, if Tyson consistently implements the proposed 
strategy, a sustainable competitive advantage can be achieved, and the 
company can remain the dominant player in the industry. Notwithstanding, a 
thorough analysis of Tyson’s competitive environment, yields material risks that 
can, in our opinion, significantly impact the company’s long-term ability to 
generate shareholder returns. 
Business launchpads 
Leveraging the leading position: as the biggest U.S. company in the sector, 
Tyson is in the pole-position to fully realize synergies and cost efficiencies. As we 
have seen in the company strategic overview of this report Tyson have 
successfully been able to leverage such capabilities. Therefore, it is important to 
understand that one of Tyson’s biggest competitive advantages is its distribution 
network, that allows the company to efficiently implement its market orientated 
strategy. Internally, they trust on a wide network of food distributors, supported by 
Tyson owned or leased cold storage warehouses, public cold storage facilities 
and their transportation system. Additionally, the company relies on its 
distribution centres to storage fresh and frozen goods in a way they can serve 
large and small customers. By having its products concentrated in one location 
they can combine partial-truckload orders into full truckloads, thus reducing 
shipping costs while growing client service making Tyson Foods a highly efficient 
operator in the market. As Exhibit 22 demonstrates, Tyson’s inventory turnover is 
lower in about 9 days when compared with its closest competitors. 
                                                 
17 Source: Company 10-K SEC filling, 2018. 
Exhibit 21:  Tyson Foods Net Debt 
evolution, 2009-2018 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Exhibit 22:  Average inventory 
holding period, days 
Source: Analysts calculations 
based on Bloomberg data. 
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Escaping the commodity trap: as proposed by Harvard’s landmark article 
“Welcome to the Experience Economy”, back in 1998 with its Progression of 
Economic Value framework (see Exhibit 23), in order to escape the handcuffs of 
exogenous market prices, typical for commodities, companies have to 
differentiate their offering. Tyson’s determination to achieve this goal is visible not 
only by focusing on the prepared food segment, but also when analysing the 
business model disruption of some of the companies it has been investing in, e.g. 
Tovala which offers an innovative internet-connected steam oven, which makes 
home cooking virtually effortless, in a very clever way of bringing Tyson’s raw 
materials to the end consumer in a more sophisticated way and wit increased 
added value.  
Move to healthy proteins: meat consumption in general is getting under 
increased scrutiny because of negative externalities for the environment. A shift 
away from red meat toward chicken and alternative proteins is already verifiable 
today. What, at first sight, could be considered a threat for Tyson for the potential 
erosion of the company’s biggest revenue generator, ends ups revealing itself as 
a big opportunity, since the company can position itself as front-runner embracing 
these new trends. Tyson New Ventures is the perfect example of how the 
company pretends to be a trend-setter in the market, rather than a trend-follower.  
Business risks 
Environmental and anti-trust issues may be a hidden liability: as one would 
expect from a big company, there are multiple court cases pending against 
Tyson. Particularly allegations of price fixing in the chicken segment, following an 
SEC investigation could result in multi-million plea agreements. 
First on January 201717 and later in 201818 a group of poultry farmers and 
supermarket chains, such as Supervalu and Haff Poultry, filed a class complain 
action against Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue and other top players in the poultry 
industry. The plaintiffs alleged that the vertically integrated chicken corporations 
colluded to fix prices and stabilize grower compensation below competitive 
levels. Meanwhile, Tyson states on its 10-k report that a motion against the 2017 
claims was filled, which is still pending, and makes no reference concerning the 
2018 claims. Although it is not likely that Tyson will be convicted, based on its 
past relations with the SEC, these allegations are already damaging its reputation 
around its stakeholders, which can lead to potential loss of clients. Nevertheless, 
price fixing allegation conviction fines can vary from a few million dollars, as 
                                                 
18 Bloomberg, Justina Vasquez (3 Jul 2018). 
Exhibit 23:  Harvard’s Progression 
of Economic Value Framework 
Source: Adapted from Harvard 
Business Review. 
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happened last year with the biggest tuna company in the U.S. Bumble Bee, that 
was forced to pay a $25 million fine19, up to $1,7 billion dollars as it happened in 
2011 with 21 global airlines being caught in the largest antitrust scheme of the 
U.S history20. To sum up, if Tyson were to be declared guilty, the damage 
caused, both monetary and reputationally, would materially affect its valuation. 
Adverse changes in the competitive setting: Tyson is heavily dependent on a 
small number of customers, which have the size and bargaining power of cutting 
the company out if they were to make significant investment; this is also related 
with the emergence of private label competition, which have grown to become 
mainstream products particularly after the economic downturn of 2008, when 
shrinking household budgets forced customers to look towards cheaper 
alternatives in their grocery shopping. However, an interesting study publish by 
IRI, one of largest big data analytics operator, suggests that consumers are still 
turning to private labels despite economic growth21. In fact, 80% of Americans 
buy private label products frequently or occasionally to save money. In Spite all 
of this, in 2018 National Brands grew at 1,5% compared to a 1,2% growth verified 
in Private Label Brands21. 
High One-Client Dependency: Agreements with customers are mostly short-
term, largely due to the nature of the products, industry practices and fluctuations 
in supply, demand and price for such products which creates an environment of 
low switching costs for Tyson clients in the commoditized business segments. 
Tyson’s biggest client is Walmart representing 17,3% of sales in 2018 and 18,6% 
of the accounts receivable. No other customer represents more than 10% of net 
accounts receivable. A loss of a client as Walmart would obviously represent a 
big downside on the company’s performance. In the past this threat was 
considered low due to the good relation between the two companies. However, in 
December 2018, Costco another Tyson client, like Walmart, announced an 
investment of $440 million on a chicken farm to fulfil 40% of its chicken supply22. 
This shows that business relationships are, by nature, ephemerous and if the 
company fails to consistently deliver an attractive value proposition, relaying on 
the oligopolistic industry setting, reactions like this are to be expected. 
The Trump effect: the trade war recently started by the Trump Administration, 
and the following introduction of retaliatory tariffs by China that can go as high as 
25%, the questioning of several trade agreements, such as NAFTA, amongst 
others, has had negative effects on Tyson’s performance, and it is highly 
                                                 
19 Fortune, Chris Morris (17 May 2018). 
20 NBC, Alicia A. Caldwell (3 May 2011). 
21 IRI® Consumer Connect™ survey results, 8 Nov 2018. 
22 CNBC, Karin Shedd (5 Dec 2018). 
Exhibit 24:  Consumer store 
selection based on the assortment 
of private label products offered 
Source: IRI® Consumer 
Connect™ survey results, 8 Nov. 
2018 
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uncertain how tit will end. If this adverse trading climate were to be maintained, it 
could seriously harm the company’s growth prospects, as it would have hindered 
access to the main international growth markets. In fact, the trade wars lived in 
the past year has been pointed out as one of the biggest drivers for the stock 
poor performance in 2018. 
Operating model 
Revenues 
Tyson’s aggressive M&A strategy has yielded the company high revenue growth 
rates in the recent past. We focus our revenue growth forecasts on organic 
growth expectations, considering the unpredictable nature of such acquisitions 
and disposals and the vast empirical evidence showing that many acquisitions 
transfer the value of synergies from the acquirers’ shareholders to the seller’s 
shareholders, and as many as two-thirds of all mergers and acquisitions 
destroying value for the acquirer23. 
We use a bottom-up approach to derive Tyson’s revenue per business segment, 
given as annual production times segment revenue. Regarding quantity, we 
expect the company to maintain its competitive position in the commodity 
segments (Beef, Pork, and Chicken), leading the production in these segments to 
increase in tandem with the evolution of the United States production, as 
forecasted by the USDA. In the Prepared Foods segment, we expect production 
to grow at real annual growth of the processed meat and seafood market in the 
U.S., which is expected to be 0,8%.  
Regarding pricing, the key driver is the extent up to which Tyson can pass on 
changes in input prices to its end consumers. According to the company, efforts 
are made to reflect such input cost volatility in the pricing strategy, nonetheless 
the intense competition in the industry can lead competitors to adopt more 
aggressive pricing strategies, accepting cuts in operational margins to gain 
market share. Conversely, the price elasticity of demand, can prevent the 
company from price increases in order to avoid reducing customer demand. 
As such, we estimate the price-cost elasticity (PCE)24 per business unit, based 
on the historical movements of princes and the estimated variation of input costs. 
Even though displaying the biggest volatility in prices, Pork has shown to be the 
unit with the greatest PCE values, followed by Beef and Chicken. As non-
commodity, Prepared Food is more subject to customer preferences and brand 
                                                 
23 See “Divide and Conquer: How Successful M&A Deals Split the Synergies”, BCG Focus (2013). 
24 Price-cost elasticity is a metric intended to analyze the extent up to which Tyson can pass on variations in input costs to 
its final customers, being calculated as the ratio between the variation of the weighted input costs, in the respective 
business unit, and the price variation. 
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awareness and the aforementioned dynamic is not equally relevant in 
determining pricing patterns. Thus, we make a simplifying assumption that price 
variations in price equal variations in costs, setting the PCE at 100%. 
Cost of Sales 
The mentioned input costs refer to the cost of sales caption in the GAAP Income 
Statement. Historically, these costs represented more than 90% of revenues, but 
in the last three years, Tyson has remarkably improved this figure, with a record 
85% in 2017. A favourable paradigm of low supply costs and a dynamic macro-
economic environment has created one-of-a-king paradigm, which will most 
certainly not be sustainable for the long-run. 
Hence, we expect the gross margin to decrease close to 1 p.p. in 2019, to 13,9% 
down from current 13,9%, mainly drive by the cost increase in Chicken, and 
partially offset by the increasing relevance of Prepared Foods, which typically 
achieves higher profit margins (Exhibit 25). 
Other operating expenses 
We expect Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A) to continue their 
increasing trend, mainly driven by increasing R&D expenses. These expenses 
are vital to achieve the company’s innovation goals and to respond to the 
demands of this changing industry. This increase is partially offset by the 
implementation of the company’s Financial Fitness Program, which is expected 
to deliver cumulated savings of $600 Million by 2020. 
Capital Expenditures 
Tyson Foods is a mature company following an inorganic growth strategy. Thus, 
it is expected to witness an increase in average Capex spending in the years to 
come as it happened in the recent past. To carry on with this level of investment 
the firm must be able to secure financing which we believe it can, giving its strong 
cash generation history observed in Exhibit 26. Historically, Capex represented 
1,5%-4,2% of the company’s total sales being the peaks directly related with the 
years of intense M&A activities and the lower values related with the divestures in 
non-core businesses. As in our model we do not directly incorporate acquisitions, 
it may be indirectly predicted in the future growth of Capex of about 2%. 
Furthermore, besides acquisitions and disposables the company consistently 
invest in its distribution network as it is one of its biggest competitive advantages, 
IT developments and operational infrastructures. 
 
 
Exhibit 27:  Capex Evolution 
Exhibit 26:  Operating Cash Flows, 
in millions U.S. $ 
Source: Analysts Estimates 
Source: Analysts Estimates 
Exhibit 25:  Gross Margin forecast 
Source: Analysts Estimates 
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Valuation 
Cost of Capital and Growth Rate 
To derive Tyson Foods overall cost of capital and properly discount the company 
cash flows we must determine the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
This approach relies on computing the company’s cost of equity under the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); cost of debt and the respective target Debt 
to Equity ratio.  
The CAPM model uses as inputs a risk-free rate, a market risk premium, and a 
beta. For the risk-free rate, we used the U.S.10-Year treasury bill of 3,03%25, 
since it is denominated in the same currency as cash flows and is perceived as a 
risk-free asset. Regarding the market risk-premium, we used the generally 
accepted 5,5%26 average suggested by the literature. In order to estimate beta, 
12 comparable firms from the same industry exposed to a similar risk profile were 
chosen. For this purpose, we selected Archer Daniels Midland Company, Bunge 
Limited, Campbell Soup Company, Conagra Foods, Inc., General Mills, Inc., 
Hormel Foods Corp., Kellogg Co., Kraft Heinz Company, Mondelez International 
Inc., PepsiCo, Inc., Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, The Coca-Cola Company, The 
Hershey Company and The J.M. Smucker Company since they all are food & 
beverage companies and are influenced by the same economic and industry 
movements. We found appropriate to use the industry beta since Tyson has 
made several significant acquisitions in the past years, which may cause 
uncharacteristic movements in its stock behaviour and consequently, its beta. 
Furthermore, beta was computed by using the weighted-average of unlevered 
rolling (5 years) betas of the industry peers that focus on operating risk and then 
it was releveled using the company estimated debt-to-equity ratio (specific risk) 
reaching a value of 0,65.  
Seeing that Tyson follows an inorganic growth strategy (acquisitions), the 
company needs to have a certain level of debt. To compute the target Debt to 
Equity ratio it was assumed the company estimation of its own target Debt as 2x 
EBITDA27. So, we averaged the last five years of EBITDA and used it to compute 
the target level of Debt. As these years presented expansion through the usage 
debt, we found a fairly proxy for the future. This way we estimate a target Debt to 
Equity ratio of 32%.  
                                                 
25 US Department of the Treasury (29/11/2018) 
26 Mckinsey Valuation – “Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies” – 6th Edition   
27 Company Reports, “Clear strategy. Real results.”, Consumer Analyst Group of New York Presentation (Feb 2018) 
Exhibit 28: WACC estimation 
Source: Analysts Estimates. 
Exhibit 29: Evolution of food 
expenditures in the U.S. 
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To derive the cost of debt, we used the yield to maturity of 5,38%28 which is the 
YTM of the company’s outstanding bond with the longest maturity (2044).  
Considering all the above-mentioned assumptions, we arrive at a cost of equity of 
6,59% and a WACC of 5,94%.  
As the company operates in vastly mature and consolidated industries, which 
have already experienced real price decreases in the last years, we assume the 
real perpetual growth rate to be 0%. This is not unreasonable, as increased in 
disposable income tend to be directed to consumption of superfluous items and 
basic needs, such as food expenditures tend to be relatively inelastic. In fact, in 
the commoditized business units, we forecast growth to be largely negative 
already in the explicit forecast period. As we perform our analysis in nominal 
terms, we compute the implicit inflation29, to arrive at a nominal growth rate of 
1,7% as detailed in Exhibit 30. Both WACC and the terminal growth rate will be 
further challenged in the sensitivity analysis section. 
Considered scenarios 
Considering the most plausible variations to our base investment case, we 
construct two alternative scenarios, which are constructed based on the following 
hypothesises: 
Downward scenario: trade disputes are not solved and Tyson is impacted by 
the enduring uncertainty, tampering the internationalization prospects. 
Domestically, claims of price-fixing are substantiated and reputational damages 
reduce sales, and increase payments to contract growers. Furthermore, political 
pressures related to the environmental issues surrounding meat production, 
represent hurdles to production, with tighter legislation being put into place, 
increasing red tape costs. 
Upward scenario: Tyson realizes the expected benefits of the Financial Fitness 
Program, improving its production efficiency and remains the leading company, 
with strong bargaining power and unmatched economies of scale. Trade 
uncertainties stabilize and economic relations with foreign countries resume 
without any surcharges or additional limitations. 
The most relevant drivers that can be impacted as per our operational model are 
the produced quantity and the Price-Cost Elasticity, that being as explained in the 
Operating Model section above, the ability of the company to pass on fluctuations 
                                                 
28 FINRA's Market Data Centre. 
29 Implicit inflation is calculated as the difference between U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and the U.S. 
Treasury Bond yield for equal 10 year maturity. 
g real 0,0%
US TIPS 1,0%
Expected inflation 1,7%
g 1,7%
Exhibit 30: Perpetual growth rate 
Source: Analysts Estimates. 
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in input costs to final customers. The table below presents the incremental 
changes on each of these metrics in the various scenarios: 
DOWNWARD 
SCENARIO 
DESCRIPTION IMPACT 
(relative to base case) 
Quantity Environmental concerns and 
political pressure forces overall 
reduction of meat consumption 
Beef, Pork and 
Prepared Food: 5% 
decrease. 
Chicken: 10% 
decrease. 
Price-Cost 
Elasticity 
Competitive pressure damages 
the company’s ability to adapt 
prices to volatility in input costs, 
eroding the top-line and tampering 
operational margins. 
20% decrease in 
PCE across all BU’s. 
Others Legal settlements of price-fixing 
allegations and imparity’s on non-
realized goodwill. 
$53 million decrease 
in debt and debt 
equivalents30. 
UPWARD 
SCENARIO 
DESCRIPTION IMPACT 
(relative to base case) 
Quantity The U.S. gains international 
competitiveness in meat 
production, and exports surpass 
the baseline USDA expectations, 
increasing the expected 
production. 
Beef, Pork, Chicken 
and Prepared Food: 
5% increase. 
Price-Cost 
Elasticity 
Economies of scale and 
integration of technology in the 
production process, easy the 
pressure on margins, and the 
move towards more value-added 
products, allows for more wiggle 
room in pricing strategies. 
Remains stable. 
Others Investments in Tyson New 
Ventures are successful and 
excess returns exceed 
expectations. 
$ 158 million increase 
in Nonconsolidated 
investments31. 
                                                 
30 High-level estimation: average between the highest historic settlement ($1,7B for 21 airlines, yielding $81M per airline 
on average) and the Bumble Bee case (which payed $25 M), the most comparable value in the food industry, as 
elaborated in the business risks section of this report. 
31 High level estimation: the average return of venture capital funds in the consumer and retail industry (the closest to 
Tyson New Ventures’ profile) was 12,19% between 2000-16, according to Cambridge Associates’ US Venture Capital 
Index and Selected Benchmark Statistics (December 2017). This would yield an expected annual return of $18,2 million 
for the invested capital of $150 million, which discounted by the WACC results in a fair value of $307,9 million. The 
proposed $158 million are thus the difference between our assessed fair value and the book value (Tyson uses the cost 
method whenever its voting rights do not exceed 20%). 
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Valuation outcome 
Considering the three scenarios we modelled, the Downward Scenario, the Base 
Scenario and the Upward Scenario, with an assigned a probability of 20, 70 and 
10 percent, respectively, our DCF model assigns an intrinsic value of $68,6 to 
Tyson’s common stock, what yields an 29% markup to its current price, as 
depicted in Exhibit 31. The increased weight of the Downward Scenario, when 
comparing to the Upward scenario is determined by the bearish outlook for stock 
markets in the coming year, with increased volatility. In the long-term, looking at 
the competitive setting of Tyson’s industry, we believe that the conjectured risks 
are more likely to happen than the benefits of the Upward Scenario32. The Base 
Scenario represents the highest as we believe to be a fair representation of the 
most likely evolution of the main value driver of value.  
 Sensitivity analysis 
In the mentioned scenario analysis, we test our model to volatility in the 
forecasted operating metrics. Nonetheless, small incremental changes in the 
WACC and perpetual growth rate assumption have a sizeable impact on the 
valuation outcome, making it imperative to test the intrinsic value derivation to 
changes in those inputs. Exhibit 32 presents the valuation outcome for 
combinations of these inputs. Three of the resulting input combinations, which 
range from $44 to $148 per share, bring the intrinsic value bellow current share 
prices. Even so, in most cases our recommendation remains unchanged.  
 
                                                 
32 The probability assignment exercise is speculative by nature and based on our research on the company and the 
market conditions, as off the elaboration of this report. 
Average revenue growth, CAGR 2018-28, %
Average ROIC including goodwill, 2018-28, %
Enterprise Value, $ Billion
Equity Value, $ Billion
Equity value per share, $
Probability, %
Expected value per share, $
Source: Analysts Estimates.
Scenario
0,6 1,9
54,2
Downward Base Upward
1,4
7,4
36.944,5
26.520,5
10,0
68,6
7,5
38.967,3
27.441,9
74,4
20,0
71,9
70,0
6,7
29.078,3
19.991,0
71,9 0,7% 1,2% 1,7% 2,2% 2,7%
4,9% 78 89 102 121 148
5,4% 67 75 85 98 116
5,9% 58 64 72 81 94
6,4% 51 56 61 69 78
6,9% 44 48 53 59 66
Source: Analysts Estimates.
W
ac
c,
 %
PGR, %Value 
Exhibit 31: Scenario-weighted DCF outcomes 
Exhibit 32: Sensitivity table 
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Triangulation 
Dividend Discount Model: Although Tyson is a consolidated company, 
operating in a mostly mature market, due to the vast M&A activity, dividend 
payout has been below what would be expected for a company in its 
circumstances. For these reasons, we consider this dividend-based valuation 
method to have several limitations. Even so we believe it to be meaningful for the 
intrinsic stock value determination as it enables a sanity check on the achieved 
values.  
Relative analysis33,34: Even though Tyson is a one-of-a-kind company, as we 
mentioned before, it operates in consolidated industries. Thus, other companies 
in these industries are expected to have similar cost structures and valuation 
fundamentals. We test four types of multiples, predominantly based on EV/ 
EBITDA, which best translates the operating performance, ignoring effects of 
capital structure. Exhibit 33 presents a summary of the obtained results.  
1. EV/ EBITDA – median of the selected peers, based on 2018 values for 
EBITDA and EV. 
2. EV/ EBITDA on forward earnings – median of the selected peers based on 
2019 EBITDA, as forecasted by Bloomberg, and 2018 EV35. 
3. EV/ EBITDA adjusted for cyclicality – median of the selected peers, based on 
the median EBITDA and EV values between 2009 and 2017. 
4. P/ E – median of the selected peers, based on 2018 values for market 
capitalization and net income.  
Valuation Football field 
Considering the results from the several applied valuation methods, we obtain a 
vast range of outcomes from $26,2 to $240,5 per share, see Exhibit 34. As we 
believe the DCF method to be the most complete analysis of the company’s 
value drivers, our recommendation follows the scenario weighted DCF valuation 
outcomes. 
                                                 
33 Selected peers: adjusted Bloomberg peer group based on similarity of historic revenue growth and ROIC. Resulting 
companies: Archer-Daniels-Midland Company; Campbell Soup Company; Conagra Brands, Inc.; Hormel Foods 
Corporation; Pilgrim's Pride Corporation; The Hershey Company; The J. M. Smucker Company; Industrias Bachoco, S.A.; 
besides Tyson Foods itself. 
34 All the EBITDA based multiples are applied to our forecasted 2019 EBITDA. 
35 Excludes Industrias Bachoco, S.A. for lack of data. 
Valuation Sumary Low Base High
EV/ EBITDA current 75 118 173
EV/ EBITDA forward 77 109 168
EV/ EBITDA cyclicality 40 113 240
P/ E current 26 61 136
Source: Analysts Estimates.
Multiples Sumary Low Base High
EV/ EBITDA current 7,5 11,9 17,4
EV/ EBITDA forward 7,7 11,0 16,8
EV/ EBITDA cyclicality 4,0 11,3 24,1
P/ E current 5,6 12,8 28,7
Source: Analysts Estimates.
Exhibit 33.1: Multiples for selected 
peers, times denominator 
Exhibit 33.2: Value per share, $ 
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Limitations 
The results obtained in this report are conditioned to the following limitations: 
• We perform an intrinsic stock valuation. Any exogenous factors such 
as investor sentiment, the ability to find the right underwriters in cases of 
equity issues, the potential effects of technical selling of professional 
investors with mandates, amongst others, are excluded of the analysis. 
• We forecast organic growth only, assuming acquisitions as zero 
NPV transactions for Tyson’s shareholders. This does not imply that 
we deem the M&A strategy do be incorrect, as zero-NPV transaction 
may be desirable, as they can improve the equity story of the stock and 
so indirectly increase the stock price. 
• We chose comparable companies based on available public 
information. Tyson’s one-of-a-kind business model, makes peer-to-peer 
comparisons less insightful, potentially reducing forecasts’ accuracy. 
• We rely upon the accuracy of the company’s financial reporting. 
Some forecasts may rely upon non-audited or forward-looking 
statements, based on our qualitative assessment on their reasonability. 
• We chose sources we deemed credible for our input costs and 
macroeconomic forecasts. We did not perform our own estimations, 
nor checked the correctness of the respective sources’ methodologies. 
Forecasts are accepted as is, and unexpected fluctuations may 
significantly impact the obtained results. 
Exhibit 34: Valuation Football Field 
          MASTER IN FINANCE 
 
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSES BY LUÍS RODRIGUES AND MARC BRANDER, MASTER IN FINANCE STUDENTS OF THE NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. THE 
REPORT WAS SUPERVISED BY A NOVA SBE FACULTY MEMBER, ACTING IN A MERE ACADEMIC CAPACITY, WHO REVIEWED THE VALUATION METHODOLOGY AND THE FINANCIAL MODEL.  
 (PLEASE REFER TO THE DISCLOSURES AND DISCLAIMERS AT END OF THE DOCUMENT) 
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Appendix 
Income Statement
in millions of US$
Sales 32.266 33.055 34.374 37.580 41.373 36.881 38.260 40.052 41.177 41.276 42.014 42.806 43.294 43.703 44.223 44.702 45.395 46.062
Cost of Sales, net of depreciation 29.634 30.422 31.542 34.401 36.847 31.567 32.535 34.203 35.449 35.519 36.211 37.005 37.394 37.667 38.092 38.459 39.097 39.710
Gross Profit, net of depreciation 2.632 2.633 2.832 3.179 4.526 5.314 5.725 5.849 5.728 5.757 5.803 5.801 5.900 6.036 6.131 6.243 6.298 6.353
Selling. General and Administrative, net of amortization 841 848 938 1.229 1.656 1.784 2.046 1.861 2.051 2.056 2.093 2.133 2.157 2.177 2.203 2.227 2.262 2.295
Other, Net (20) (23) (20) 53 (36) (8) 31 (33) - - - - - - - - - -
EBITDA 1.811 1.808 1.914 1.897 2.906 3.538 3.648 4.021 3.676 3.700 3.710 3.668 3.743 3.859 3.928 4.016 4.036 4.058
Depreciation 433 443 474 494 609 617 642 723 747 731 733 746 760 768 776 785 793 806
Amortization 73 56 45 26 92 80 106 210 227 234 234 238 243 246 248 251 254 258
EBIT (Operating Income) 1.305 1.309 1.395 1.377 2.205 2.841 2.900 3.088 2.702 2.736 2.743 2.684 2.740 2.845 2.904 2.980 2.989 2.995
Interest income 11 12 7 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 28 63
Interest expense 242 356 145 132 293 249 279 350 339 347 293 252 212 163 108 54 27 27
EBT 1.074 965 1.257 1.252 1.921 2.598 2.628 2.745 2.369 2.396 2.458 2.440 2.536 2.690 2.803 2.933 2.990 3.030
Income Tax Expense 341 351 409 396 697 826 850 (282) 627 635 651 647 673 715 746 781 797 808
Loss from Discontinued Operation. Net of Tax - 38 70 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Net Income 733 576 778 856 1.224 1.772 1.778 3.027 1.742 1.762 1.806 1.793 1.863 1.975 2.058 2.152 2.193 2.222
Check [Calculation = Reporting] TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Other Comprehensive Income (Loss). Net of Taxes:
Derivatives accounted for as cash flow hedges (17) 17 (14) 1 2 (1) - (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7)
Investments (8) - (3) 4 (1) - (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
Currency translation (41) 3 (37) (30) 36 4 6 (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29)
Postretirement benefits (13) (4) 9 (14) 20 42 56 (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7)
Total Other Comprehensive Income (Loss). Net of Taxes (79) 16 (45) (39) 57 45 61 (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44)
Comprehensive Income 654 592 733 817 1.281 1.817 1.839 2.983 1.698 1.718 1.762 1.749 1.819 1.931 2.014 2.108 2.149 2.178
Less: Comprehensive Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests (17) (7) - (8) 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Comprehensive Income Attributable to Tyson 671 599 733 825 1.277 1.813 1.835 2.980 1.695 1.715 1.759 1.746 1.816 1.928 2.011 2.105 2.146 2.175  
 
Statement of Changes in Shareholders' Equity
in millions of US$
Initial Balance 5.166 5.657 6.012 6.201 8.890 9.691 9.608 10.541 12.803 14.406 16.026 17.688 19.341 21.055 22.867 24.750 26.717 28.720
Comprehensive Income
Net Income 733 576 778 856 1.224 1.772 1.778 3.027 1.742 1.762 1.806 1.793 1.863 1.975 2.058 2.152 2.193 2.222
Other Comprehensive Income (79) 16 (45) (39) 57 45 61 (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44)
Less: Comprehensive Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests (17) (7) - (8) 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Total Comprehensive Income 671 599 733 825 1.277 1.813 1.835 2.980 1.695 1.715 1.759 1.746 1.816 1.928 2.011 2.105 2.146 2.175
Transactions with Shareholders
Dividends (59) (57) (106) (115) (155) (233) (346) (458) (264) (267) (273) (271) (282) (299) (311) (326) (332) (336)
Share repurchases, net shares issued (210) (264) (614) 1.833 (495) (1.943) (858) (427) - - - - - - - - - -
Share based compensation 89 77 176 146 174 280 302 167 172 172 175 178 181 182 184 186 189 192
Net Transactions with Shareholders (180) (244) (544) 1.864 (476) (1.896) (902) (718) (92) (94) (98) (93) (101) (117) (127) (139) (143) (144)
Closing Balance 5.657 6.012 6.201 8.890 9.691 9.608 10.541 12.803 14.406 16.026 17.688 19.341 21.055 22.867 24.750 26.717 28.720 30.752  
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
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Balance Sheet
Total Funds Invested: Uses
in millions of US$
Operating Cash 645 661 687 438 688 349 318 270 336 337 343 350 354 357 361 894 908 921
Operating cash, in % of sales 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Accounts Receivable 1.321 1.378 1.497 1.684 1.620 1.542 1.675 1.723 1.744 1.748 1.779 1.813 1.833 1.851 1.873 1.893 1.922 1.950
Inventories 2.587 2.809 2.817 3.274 2.878 2.732 3.239 3.513 3.239 3.246 3.309 3.382 3.417 3.442 3.481 3.514 3.573 3.629
Other Current Assets 156 145 144 378 193 261 216 181 235 236 240 244 247 250 253 255 259 263
Total Operating Current Assets 4.709 4.993 5.145 5.774 5.379 4.884 5.448 5.687 5.555 5.567 5.671 5.788 5.851 5.899 5.967 6.557 6.662 6.763
Accounts Payable 1.264 1.372 1.359 1.806 1.662 1.511 1.698 1.694 1.768 1.771 1.806 1.845 1.865 1.878 1.899 1.918 1.949 1.980
Other current liabilities 1.040 943 1.138 1.207 1.158 1.172 1.424 1.426 1.331 1.334 1.358 1.384 1.399 1.413 1.429 1.445 1.467 1.489
Total  Operating Current Liabilities 2.304 2.315 2.497 3.013 2.820 2.683 3.122 3.120 3.098 3.105 3.163 3.229 3.264 3.291 3.329 3.362 3.417 3.469
Operating Working Capital 2.405 2.678 2.648 2.761 2.559 2.201 2.326 2.567 2.456 2.461 2.508 2.560 2.587 2.609 2.639 3.194 3.245 3.295
Net PP&E 3.823 4.022 4.053 5.130 5.176 5.170 5.568 6.169 6.036 6.050 6.158 6.274 6.346 6.406 6.482 6.552 6.654 6.752
Net Intagible Assets 149 129 138 5.276 5.168 5.084 4.728 5.244 6.949 6.966 7.090 7.224 7.306 7.375 7.463 7.544 7.661 7.773
Other Operating Assets 150 180 214 233 231 254 295 316 260 261 266 271 274 276 280 283 287 291
Other Operating Liabilities 345 389 403 738 809 883 941 965 752 753 767 781 790 798 807 816 829 841
Other Operating assets, net liabilities (195) (209) (189) (505) (578) (629) (646) (649) (491) (492) (501) (511) (516) (521) (527) (533) (541) (549)
Invested Capital (Excluding GoodWill) 6.182 6.620 6.650 12.662 12.325 11.826 11.976 13.331 14.949 14.985 15.255 15.547 15.723 15.868 16.056 16.757 17.019 17.270
Goodwill and acquired intagibles 1.892 1.891 1.902 6.706 6.667 6.669 10.839 11.254 10.012 10.037 10.216 10.409 10.527 10.627 10.753 10.870 11.038 11.200
Cumulative amortization and depreciation 589 589 589 594 617 617 617 617 - - - - - - - - - -
Invested Capital (Including GoodWill) 8.663 9.100 9.141 19.962 19.609 19.112 23.432 25.202 24.962 25.022 25.471 25.956 26.250 26.495 26.810 27.627 28.057 28.471
Excess Cash 71 410 458 - - - - - - - - - - - - 366 1.952 3.582
Assets Held For Sale - - - 305 - - 803 - - - - - - - - - - -
Investments in joint ventures and other entities 153 151 173 298 253 215 239 280 244 245 249 254 257 259 262 265 269 273
Available for Sale Securities 124 120 94 93 95 97 98 98 115 115 117 119 121 122 123 125 127 128
Post Retirement Benefit Assets - - - - - - 44 61 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 15 15
Total Funds Invested 9.011 9.781 9.866 20.658 19.957 19.424 24.616 25.641 25.335 25.395 25.851 26.344 26.642 26.891 27.210 28.397 30.420 32.469  
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
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Total Funds Invested: Sorces
in millions of US$
Short-Term Debt 70 515 513 643 715 79 906 1.911 724 725 738 752 761 768 777 786 798 810
Long-Term Debt 2.112 1.917 1.895 7.535 5.975 6.200 9.297 7.962 9.388 7.819 6.594 5.424 3.986 2.393 805 - - -
Post Retirement Benefit Liabilities 131 160 157 532 495 359 258 233 319 319 325 331 335 338 342 346 351 356
Noncontrolling interests 28 30 32 14 15 16 18 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Debt and Debt Equivalents 2.341 2.622 2.597 8.724 7.200 6.654 10.479 10.114 10.438 8.872 7.666 6.515 5.089 3.507 1.932 1.139 1.157 1.174
Deferred Tax Liabilities, Operating 424 558 479 2.450 2.449 2.545 2.979 2.107 491 497 498 488 498 517 528 541 543 544
Cumulative amortization and depreciation 589 589 589 594 617 617 617 617 - - - - - - - - - -
Shareholders's Equity 5.657 6.012 6.201 8.890 9.691 9.608 10.541 12.803 14.406 16.026 17.688 19.341 21.055 22.867 24.750 26.717 28.720 30.752
Equity and equity equivalents 6.670 7.159 7.269 11.934 12.757 12.770 14.137 15.527 14.897 16.523 18.186 19.828 21.553 23.384 25.278 27.258 29.263 31.296
Total Funnds Invested 9.011 9.781 9.866 20.658 19.957 19.424 24.616 25.641 25.335 25.395 25.851 26.344 26.642 26.891 27.210 28.397 30.420 32.469
Check cell TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Income Statement, Reformulated
in millions of US$
Revenues 32.266 33.055 34.374 37.580 41.373 36.881 38.260 40.052 41.177 41.276 42.014 42.806 43.294 43.703 44.223 44.702 45.395 46.062
Cost of Sales, operational 29.634 30.422 31.542 34.401 36.847 31.567 32.535 34.203 35.449 35.519 36.211 37.005 37.394 37.667 38.092 38.459 39.097 39.710
Add: Pension adjustment (7) (31) (18) (1) (11) 28 10 24 - - - - - - - - - -
S,G&A 841 848 938 1.229 1.656 1.784 2.046 1.861 2.051 2.056 2.093 2.133 2.157 2.177 2.203 2.227 2.262 2.295
EBITDA, adjusted 1.784 1.754 1.876 1.949 2.859 3.558 3.689 4.012 3.676 3.700 3.710 3.668 3.743 3.859 3.928 4.016 4.036 4.058
Depreciation 433 443 474 494 609 617 642 723 747 731 733 746 760 768 776 785 793 806
Amortization 73 56 45 26 92 80 106 210 227 234 234 238 243 246 248 251 254 258
EBIT 1.278 1.255 1.357 1.429 2.158 2.861 2.941 3.079 2.702 2.736 2.743 2.684 2.740 2.845 2.904 2.980 2.989 2.995
Operating cash taxes 434 330 542 (1.449) 823 873 535 683 2.336 723 729 726 720 739 763 780 795 797
NOPLAT 844 925 815 2.878 1.335 1.988 2.406 2.396 366 2.013 2.014 1.958 2.020 2.106 2.141 2.200 2.194 2.198
Reconciliation with Net Income
Net Income 733 576 778 856 1.224 1.772 1.778 3.027 1.742 1.762 1.806 1.793 1.863 1.975 2.058 2.152 2.193 2.222
Nonoperating taxes (93) (113) (54) (126) (125) (143) (119) (93) (93) (94) (79) (68) (57) (43) (28) (13) 0 10
Increase (decrease) in operating deferred taxes - 134 (79) 1.971 (1) 96 434 (872) (1.616) 6 1 (11) 10 19 11 14 2 1
Interest expense 242 356 145 132 293 249 279 350 339 347 293 252 212 163 108 54 27 27
Interest income (11) (12) (7) (7) (9) (6) (7) (7) (6) (7) (7) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) (28) (63)
Nonoperating expenses (20) (23) (20) 53 (36) (8) 31 (33) - - - - - - - - - -
Net pension adjustments (7) (31) (18) (1) (11) 28 10 24 - - - - - - - - - -
Loss from Discontinued Operation. Net of Tax - 38 70 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NOPLAT 844 925 815 2.878 1.335 1.988 2.406 2.396 366 2.013 2.014 1.958 2.020 2.106 2.141 2.200 2.194 2.198
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Free Cash Flow
in millions of US$
NOPLAT 844 925 815 2.878 1.335 1.988 2.406 2.396 366 2.013 2.014 1.958 2.020 2.106 2.141 2.200 2.194 2.198
Depreciation 433 443 474 494 609 617 642 723 747 731 733 746 760 768 776 785 793 806
Amortization 73 56 45 26 92 80 106 210 227 234 234 238 243 246 248 251 254 258
Gross cash flow 1.350 1.424 1.334 3.398 2.036 2.685 3.154 3.329 1.340 2.978 2.981 2.942 3.023 3.120 3.165 3.236 3.242 3.261
Decrease (increase) in operating working capital (273) 30 (113) 202 358 (125) (241) 111 (5) (46) (52) (28) (21) (30) (555) (51) (49)
Capital expenditures, net of disposals (642) (505) (1.571) (655) (611) (1.040) (1.324) (614) (745) (841) (862) (831) (828) (852) (855) (895) (903)
Investments in internal intangible assets (36) (54) (5.164) 16 4 250 (726) (1.932) (251) (359) (372) (325) (315) (336) (332) (371) (370)
Investments in goodwill and acquired intangibles 1 (11) (4.804) 39 (2) (4.170) (415) 1.242 (24) (179) (193) (119) (99) (126) (116) (169) (162)
Decrease (increase) in other operating assets, net other liabilities 14 (20) 316 73 51 17 3 (158) 1 9 9 6 5 6 6 8 8
Foreign currency translation (41) 3 (37) (30) 36 4 6 (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29)
Gross investmet (41) (933) (597) (11.366) (289) (196) (5.062) (2.732) (1.380) (1.053) (1.445) (1.498) (1.326) (1.288) (1.367) (1.882) (1.506) (1.506)
Free Cash Flow 1.309 491 737 (7.968) 1.747 2.489 (1.908) 597 (40) 1.924 1.535 1.444 1.697 1.832 1.798 1.354 1.735 1.755
Nonoperating income and expenses 20 23 20 (53) 36 8 (31) 33 - - - - - - - - - -
Interest income 11 12 7 7 9 6 7 7 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 28 63
Other Comprehensive Income, excluding currency (38) 13 (8) (9) 21 41 55 (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15)
Nonoperating taxes 93 113 54 126 125 143 119 93 93 94 79 68 57 43 28 13 (0) (10)
Decrease (increase) in excess cash (339) (48) 458 - - - - - - - - - - - (366) (1.586) (1.629)
Decrease (increase) in investments 6 4 (429) 348 36 (828) 762 19 (1) (6) (7) (4) (4) (5) (4) (6) (6)
Loss (gain) from discontinued operations - 38 70 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Nonopoerating cash flow 86 (135) 99 99 539 234 (678) 880 102 86 65 53 45 32 16 (364) (1.580) (1.597)
Cash flow available to investors 1.394 357 836 (7.868) 2.286 2.723 (2.586) 1.477 63 2.010 1.601 1.498 1.742 1.865 1.814 989 155 158
Reconciliation of cash available to investors
Interest expense 242 356 145 132 293 249 279 350 339 347 293 252 212 163 108 54 27 27
Decrease (increase) in short-term debt (445) 2 (130) (72) 636 (827) (1.005) 1.187 (2) (13) (14) (9) (7) (9) (8) (12) (12)
Decrease (increase) in long-term debt 255 164 (5.655) 1.575 (173) (3.037) 1.335 (1.426) 1.569 1.225 1.170 1.438 1.592 1.589 805 - -
Pension and postretirements benefits, net cash out (in) 9 (45) (17) (362) 10 111 95 66 (133) (1) (5) (6) (4) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5)
Flows to debt holders 251 122 294 (6.014) 1.807 824 (3.490) 746 (32) 1.913 1.500 1.402 1.638 1.745 1.684 847 10 11
Dividends 59 57 106 115 155 233 346 458 264 267 273 271 282 299 311 326 332 336
Repurchased (issued) shares 210 264 614 (1.833) 495 1.943 858 427 - - - - - - - - - -
Share based compensation (89) (77) (176) (146) (174) (280) (302) (167) (172) (172) (175) (178) (181) (182) (184) (186) (189) (192)
Minority interest earnings (17) (7) - (8) 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Decrease (increase) in noncontrolling interests (2) (2) 18 (1) (1) (2) 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flows to equity holders 163 235 542 (1.854) 479 1.899 904 731 95 98 101 96 104 120 130 142 146 147
Cash flow available to investors 414 357 836 (7.868) 2.286 2.723 (2.586) 1.477 63 2.010 1.601 1.498 1.742 1.865 1.814 989 155 158
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Beef Unit
Weekly capacity ('000 Heads) 175 174 173 173 176 165 162 156 157 159 161 162 164 165 167 168 170 172
Annual capacity  ('000 Heads) 9.100 9.048 8.996 8.996 9.152 8.580 8.424 8.112 8.190 8.268 8.347 8.426 8.507 8.588 8.670 8.753 8.837 8.921
Utilization rate (%) 81% 76% 78% 77% 73% 76% 80% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85%
Annual Production ('000 Heads) 7.371 6.876 7.017 6.927 6.681 6.521 6.739 6.895 6.961 7.028 7.095 7.163 7.231 7.300 7.370 7.440 7.511 7.583
Average Revenue per Head ($) 1.838 2.000 2.052 2.335 2.580 2.226 2.200 2.244 2.271 2.234 2.212 2.205 2.197 2.181 2.160 2.152 2.150 2.148
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) 13.549 13.755 14.400 16.177 17.236 14.513 14.823 15.473 15.808 15.698 15.692 15.792 15.889 15.920 15.921 16.009 16.152 16.287
Y/Y % Growth - 1,5% 4,7% 12,3% 6,5% -15,8% 2,1% 4,4% 2,2% -0,7% 0,0% 0,6% 0,6% 0,2% 0,0% 0,6% 0,9% 0,8%
Pork Unit
Weekly capacity ('000 Heads) 448 448 444 445 456 456 456 458 464 471 478 484 491 498 505 512 520 527
Annual capacity  ('000 Heads) 23.296 23.296 23.088 23.140 23.712 23.712 23.712 23.816 24.153 24.495 24.841 25.193 25.549 25.911 26.277 26.649 27.026 27.408
Utilization rate (%) 89% 90% 88% 86% 88% 91% 93% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89%
Annual Production ('000 Heads) 20.733 20.966 20.317 19.900 20.867 21.578 22.052 21.196 21.496 21.800 22.109 22.421 22.739 23.060 23.387 23.718 24.053 24.393
Average Revenue per Head ($) 263,34 262,80 266,18 316,78 252,17 227,50 237,53 230,18 234,11 223,17 230,01 232,52 233,34 235,16 236,97 237,50 238,92 239,35
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) 5.460 5.510 5.408 6.304 5.262 4.909 5.238 4.879 5.033 4.865 5.085 5.214 5.306 5.423 5.542 5.633 5.747 5.838
Y/Y % Growth - 0,9% -1,9% 16,6% -16,5% -6,7% 6,7% -6,9% 3,1% -3,3% 4,5% 2,5% 1,8% 2,2% 2,2% 1,6% 2,0% 1,6%
Chicken Unit
Weekly capacity ('000 Heads) 46.000 47.000 47.000 40.000 39.000 39.000 39.000 42.000 42.406 42.816 43.230 43.648 44.070 44.496 44.927 45.361 45.800 46.242
Annual capacity  ('000 Heads) 2.392.000 2.444.000 2.444.000 2.080.000 2.028.000 2.028.000 2.028.000 2.184.000 2.205.117 2.226.439 2.247.967 2.269.703 2.291.649 2.313.807 2.336.180 2.358.769 2.381.576 2.404.604
Utilization rate (%) 92% 88% 87% 90% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89% 89%
Annual Production ('000 Heads) 2.200.640 2.150.720 2.126.280 1.872.000 1.804.920 1.804.920 1.804.920 1.943.760 1.962.555 1.981.531 2.000.691 2.020.036 2.039.568 2.059.289 2.079.200 2.099.304 2.119.603 2.140.098
Average Revenue per Head ($) 5,01 5,29 5,17 5,94 6,31 6,05 6,32 6,20 6,39 6,48 6,59 6,71 6,70 6,67 6,70 6,68 6,72 6,76
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) 11.017 11.368 10.988 11.116 11.390 10.927 11.409 12.044 12.538 12.846 13.183 13.554 13.664 13.732 13.936 14.033 14.253 14.476
Y/Y % Growth - 3,2% -3,3% 1,2% 2,5% -4,1% 4,4% 5,6% 4,1% 2,5% 2,6% 2,8% 0,8% 0,5% 1,5% 0,7% 1,6% 1,6%
Prepared Foods Unit
Weekly capacity ('000 000 Pounds) 45 46 49 85 78 78 88 77 78 78 79 79 80 81 81 82 83 83
Annual capacity  ('000 000 Pounds) 2.340 2.392 2.548 4.420 4.056 4.056 4.576 4.004 4.036 4.068 4.101 4.134 4.167 4.200 4.234 4.268 4.302 4.336
Utilization rate (%) 85% 85% 83% 86% 87% 84% 85% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86%
Annual Production ('000 000 Pounds) 1.989 2.033 2.115 3.801 3.529 3.407 3.890 3.443 3.471 3.499 3.527 3.555 3.583 3.612 3.641 3.670 3.699 3.729
Average Revenue per Pound ($) 1,62 1,59 1,57 1,03 2,22 2,16 2,02 2,52 2,58 2,58 2,62 2,67 2,71 2,75 2,79 2,84 2,88 2,93
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) 3.215 3.237 3.322 3.927 7.822 7.346 7.853 8.668 8.947 9.028 9.251 9.482 9.707 9.937 10.172 10.414 10.672 10.932
Y/Y % Growth - 0,7% 2,6% 18,2% 99,2% -6,1% 6,9% 10,4% 3,2% 0,9% 2,5% 2,5% 2,4% 2,4% 2,4% 2,4% 2,5% 2,4%
Others Unit
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) 127 167 1.370 1.381 879 380 349 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305
Y/Y % Growth 31,5% 720,4% 0,8% -36,4% -56,8% -8,2% -12,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Intersegment Sales Unit
Segment Revenue ('000 000$) (1.102) (982) (1.114) (1.325) (1.216) (1.194) (1.412) (1.317) (1.453) (1.466) (1.503) (1.540) (1.577) (1.614) (1.652) (1.692) (1.734) (1.776)
in % of Prepared Food sales 34,3% 30,3% 33,5% 33,7% 15,5% 16,3% 18,0% 15,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2% 16,2%  
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
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Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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Abstract 
Companies in mature industries have a constraint on organic growth. Market leaders typically 
avoid the stagnation trap with an aggressive M&A strategy, Tyson Foods being a textbook 
example of such a reality. This paradigm assumes that the latent synergies of the combined 
businesses, allow the acquirer to pay a price premium. However, empirical evidence has 
questioned this theory, as a considerable share of  M&A transactions have been shown to 
destroy value. Thus, even though the materialization of synergies may not be “low-hanging 
fruit”, considering past successes, it is believed that Keystone and future acquisitions have a 
strong value-adding potential, despite the international challenges. 
Keywords: M&A, Synergies, Limits on organic growth. 
 
Contents 
Contextualization ....................................................................................................................... 3 
Acquisitions’ Impact on Valuations ........................................................................................... 3 
Integration Track Record, Strategic Acquisition Growth .......................................................... 5 
Tyson’s Recent Acquisitions Outlook........................................................................................ 6 
References .................................................................................................................................. 7 
 
  
3 
 
Contextualization 
In a well consolidated food and beverage industry with low growth, as in the United States, the 
most efficient way of sustaining growth is through acquisitions and through global expansion. 
During 2018 first three quarters alone, there were 157 transactions in the industry, 40% of which 
by Tyson’s direct related parties (Capstone Headwaters, 2018). Historically most of the growth 
observed in Tyson is related to acquisitions throughout its value chain, and trough companies 
that could provide new capabilities, new brands to grow, increased scale/synergies and new 
geographic markets. It seems that the company have successfully acquired and integrated these 
new businesses throughout the years maximizing their synergies and dispose what wasn’t 
aligned with the company core strategy. Thus, Tyson built a truly diversified portfolio within 
the protein industry due to heavy M&A activity. The purpose of this report it to analyse if, 
indeed, the biggest Tyson’s acquisitions of the 21st century generated the desired 
synergies/growth and to analyse if the recent acquisitions will be the launchpad for the 
company’s future growth.  
Acquisitions’ Impact on Valuations 
General literature points out that more than half of M&A transactions destroy value for the 
buyer instead of realizing the proposed “synergies” announced upfront purchasing (The Boston 
Consulting Group and Technische Universität München, 2013). In fact, two out of three 
transactions fail to deliver shareholders returns at least in the short run. However, corporate 
consolidation continues to be a phenomenon highly seen in modern economies, such as the U.S. 
as it can be perceived in the graph below1. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: IMAAanalysis;imaa-institute.org 
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Therefore, it is perfectly understandable to raise the question of why the number and volume of 
M&A keeps increasing throughout the years, given these hard historically evidence.  
There are 4 main drivers for a company to pursue a successful inorganic growth strategy 
(McKinsey & Company, 2017): 
1. Take advantage of the buyer scale, client base, distribution network, cost structure, 
marketing capabilities, etc. to improve the targets profitability and performance. 
2. Remove capacity from the market to effectively “control” prices and decrease 
competition in a way that sustainable margins can developed. Also, to become bigger 
since organic growth is generally much slower in achieving the same market share. 
3. Get access to technologies that otherwise would be hard to develop internally or too 
costly to be outsourced, new capabilities. 
4. Identify related targets in order to diversify business risk and the acquirer portfolio. 
Most targets identified along the supply/value chain  
Nonetheless, it is important to refer that if the buyer overprice the target, no synergy will ever 
be proven to positively impact shareholder’s returns. 
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Besides the above-mentioned benefits on the company’s value there are other not so obvious 
impacts on a company valuation due to M&A activity. For instance, by buying a foreign 
company and move the merged entity’s tax base overseas to a lower-tax jurisdiction, will 
substantially reduce its tax bill. This behaviour was commonly seen in countries as the U.S.A. 
since until recently it had one of the highest corporate tax rates in the developed economies 
landscape (Congressional Budget Office, 2017). Furthermore, M&A will change the company’s 
Capital Structure and impact its WACC. Whereas these operations normally require increases 
in a company’s indebtedness, the higher debt share may well be justified by the added cash 
flows contributed by the target firm. Lastly, among many other not analysed in this report, 
another reason to by a company is the accretive acquisition where a company with a higher 
price-earnings ratio acquires a firm with a lower ratio. This way the merged company will have 
a boost in its earnings per share without creating any additional intrinsic value. 
Integration Track Record, Strategic Acquisition Growth 
Throughout the 21st century Tyson have been involved in some large acquisitions following its 
strategy referred in the main report as we can observe with higher detain in Appendix 1. For 
the purpose of this report it is only going to be discussed the integration of Tyson’s 3 major 
acquisitions: IBP (2001), Hillshire Brands (2014) and Advanced Pierre (2017). Back in 2001 
Tyson was already a multinational company but with a sole focus on chicken integrated 
production. It was with the acquisition of IBP that Tyson become a truly diversified business 
and built the business units it operates under, nowadays. This $4,6 b investment made Tyson’s 
sales more than double in just one year from 10,5 b up to 23,3 b as well as it net operating 
income rose in about 400% and its earnings per share passed from 0,4$ up to 1,08€. This 
acquisition was paid partially with 1,7 b in cash, 1,2 b by issuing class A shares and the 1,7 b 
in debt IBP had was assumed as a way of payment. Approximately, 1,8 b was generated in 
goodwill. This premium was justified due to all the future benefits the acquisition would bring. 
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These benefits happened to be verified with the pass of time as the share price more than double 
ever since pass the acquisition until now being this purchase one of the key enablers of Tyson’s 
current success. The more recent acquisitions of Hillshire Brands and Advanced Pierre 
produced the same good results as IBP did back in 2001 however this acquisition were related 
with the company strategy of moving from its commodity business to the Value-added branded 
segment. Furthermore the acquisition of Hillshire Brands allowed the company to reduced it 
COGS in percentage of sales from about 90% to around 85% which impact massively Tyson’s 
profitability. 
Tyson’s Future Outlook 
With the change of CEO occurred in September 2018 the strategic focus of the company is 
being leaned more than ever upon international growth. The acquisition of Keystone Foods, 
happening in the first quarter of 2019 will set the pace at which this strategy will success or fail.  
Keystone is a leading provider of chicken, beef, fish and pork to the growing global foodservice 
industry such as Asia Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. This will be the 
perfect opportunity for Tyson to take advantage of the growth experienced in international 
markets at the same time it will deliver new IT capabilities and benefit from Tyson scale as it 
happened in the past. To sum up, based on the company’s past acquisitions we do believe that 
the company will be able to integrate this new business however it is still unclear if it will be 
able to succeed in foreign markets giving all the international instability and its past failures at 
Brazil, Mexico and partially in China. 
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APPENDIXES 
1. Tyson’s Major M&A Deals in the 21st Century; Source: Company’s 10-K Reports 
 
A
B
C
D
E
F
*(A) IBP, inc., the 
world’s largest 
supplier of
premium beef and 
pork products at the 
time, and its 
Foodbrands
prepared foods 
division.
-
*(A) Acquisition of 
Millard Processing 
Services, a bacon 
processing operation
-
n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a.
-
*(D) Mallard’s Foods 
processing plants
- -
*(D) Harrisonburg, 
Va., poultry complex 
sold to George’s, Inc.
-
-
-
-
* (A) Investment on 
60% of the capital of 
the now designed 
Tyson Xinchang 
Foods
-
*(A) Became 100% 
owner of the poultry 
operation in
the Shandong 
province of China. 
Now known as
Tyson Shandong.
-
*(D) Sale of a non-
protein business, 
Kettle
*(E.) Sale of non-
protein Sara Lee 
Frozen Bakery and 
Van’s businesses
*(F) Sale of non-
protein TNT Crust 
business
*(D) Sold assets in 
Weifang, China.
-
-
-
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Foods, Chicken
Business unit 
impacted: Prepared 
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- -
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Hillshire Brands 
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Macedo, Avita and 
Frangobrás chicken
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California-Based 
Circle Foods
*(B) Acquisition of a 
Value added food 
business 
*(A) Acquired 51% of 
Godrej Foods, a 
poultry processing 
businesses in India
*(A) Assets of Don 
Julio Foods of Utah
*(A) Acquisition of 
American Proteins, 
Inc.,  AMPRO 
Products 
*(B) Acquisition of 
Keystone foods 
anounced 1st quarter 
2019
*(C.) Acquisition of 
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* (A) Aquisition of 
Advanced Pierre
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Holdings, Inc.
-
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in the IBP acquisition
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Abstract 
Historically burdened by a high corporate tax environment, the so-called Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, enacted in December 2017, aimed to increase the country’s international tax 
competitiveness. In practice, this meant multi-million tax relieves for American corporations, 
with soaring market valuations. Increasing cash available to shareholders, its short-term 
impact seems undoubtable, however secondary effects companies’ optimal capital structure 
and the effectiveness of the application of the reform’s cash blessing are yet to be determined, 
and the very sustainability of the reform is yet questionable. Thus, prudence is the forecast of 
future tax payments is advisable.   
Keywords: Trump tax reform, Tax Act, Tax impact in valuation, Tax savings. 
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Contextualization 
Historically, the United States have had one of the highest corporate tax rates of the 
developed countries, as depicted in Exhibit 1 (CBO, 2017). This reality has prompted 
American companies to develop intricate tax avoidance schemes, mainly by moving corporate 
centers outside of the U.S. 
 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
Signed into law by President Trump on December 22th, 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(hereafter referred to as Tax Act) is described as the most sweeping tax legislation since the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Smith & Howard, 2018).  
Main changes for businesses at a glance: 
1. Reduction of the corporate income tax rate to 21%: starting in 2018, this represents 
a significant reduction to the former rate of 35%. 
Exhibit 1: Corporate Tax Rates in selected G20 countries in 2012, % 
Source: Adapted from the Congressional Budget Office. 
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2. Changes in credits and deductions: limiting the deductibility of net interest expense 
to 30% of EBIT1, the elimination of domestic production activity deduction or net 
operating loss carrybacks and limiting carryforwards to 80% of taxable income (Tax 
Foundation, 2017) can materially impact the taxable income. 
3. Move to a territorial tax system: traditionally the U.S. applied a so-called worldwide 
tax system2. With the new system, corporations only pay the U.S. tax rate for U.S. 
generated income. Base erosion rules, relating to Controlled Foreign Operations 
(CFC)3 where strengthened, changing dispositions on the base erosion payment’s 
calculation, an introducing GILTI4. 
Impacts on Valuation 
The Tax Act has a twofold effect for valuation purposes, on the one side it reduces the 
corporate tax rate, and on the other side it introduces changes to the determination of the 
taxable income. These effects impact the following valuation metrics: 
1. Unlevered Free Cash Flows: operating cash taxes are expected to decrease for most 
companies in the U.S., which increases UFCF’s as a direct consequence. Even though 
the effect may seem straightforward, changes in deductions and other provisions 
affecting taxable income can unfold differently amongst different companies. 
2. WACC: the marginal tax rate is a direct input of the WACC formula, for its impact on 
the cost of debt (debt tax shield), which is expected to increase. Nonetheless, indirect 
effects in the cost of equity due to the increased uncertainty on the achievement of the 
expected cash flows, as changing political majorities could revert the Tax Act’s 
                                                 
1 In the first four years 30% limit is applied to EBITDA. 
2 U.S. based corporations payed tax on their global revenues, deducting a credit for taxes paid to overseas 
countries. 
3 Provisions typically targeting “highly mobile passive income” such as dividends, interest royalties, etc. (Tax 
Foundation, 2017) 
4 New provision to tax Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income. 
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changes. This material change in the cost of equity and debt, can change the capital 
structure, making the overall effect in the WACC uncertain and, again, dependent on 
company specificities (EY, 2017). 
3. Terminal Value: certain provisions of the Tax Act are temporary, e.g. “Temporary 
100 percent expensing for certain business assets”5, or the “New employer credit for 
paid family and medical leave”6, according to the Internal Revenue Service (2018). 
Considering such temporary incentives in the perpetuity calculation may lead to 
valuation errors. 
4. ROIC: incentives to repatriate overseas money and generally lower taxes leaves 
companies “sitting” on a pile of money. Thus, it become pivotal to address how 
companies are planning to use this cash. As pointed out by Deloitte (2018), the 2004 
Bush tax break lead to increased M&A activity and share buyback programs. Other 
possibilities such as debt repayments or increased dividends are also likely to be 
considered. The resulting allocation decisions will impact the Invested Capital and 
ROIC. 
Summing up, even though the company-specific implications are not yet fully known, the 
12% soar in the S&P 500 index between September 2017, when Tax Reform first became the 
center of political attention, and the end of January 2018, when the Tax Act was enacted (St. 
Louis Business Journal, 2018), seems to point for the overall positive market sentiment on 
company value impact. 
                                                 
5 Allows 100% expensing for business property acquired and placed in service after Sept. 27, 2017 and before 
Jan. 1, 2023. 
6 Allows a tax credit on ages paid in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 
2020, for paid family and medical leave. 
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The case of Tyson 
Tyson Foods’ fiscal year does not coincide with 
the calendar year, the impacts of the Tax act where 
not fully felt in fiscal 18 (FY18), as a blended 
federal income tax rate of 24,5% was applied. 
According to the company, the Tax Act resulted in 
a benefit of $1.004 million in FY18, mainly due to 
deferred tax remeasurement (Tyson Foods, 2018). 
This yielded a negative effective tax rate for FY18 
of -10,3%, check Exhibit 2. As a result, the 
company announced a one-time cash bonus of $100 million to its employees (Tyson Foods, 
2018).  
In order to fully understand 
the tax impact a simulation 
was prepared, in which the 
base case considers a 
moderate tax scenario, with 
the statutory tax rate 
remaining 27,8% on average 
in the future. Alternatively, 
the aggressive case considers 
full materialization of the Tax Act in perpetuity. Exhibit 3 shows the main impacted metrics 
and the effect on intrinsic value.  
Exhibit 2: Tyson Foods tax rates, 
2011-18, % 
Source: Company data. 
Exhibit 3: Tyson Foods tax valuation scenarios 
Cost of equity, % (1)
After-tax cost of debt, %
WACC, %
Average operating cash taxes, million $
Average operating cash taxes, %
Enterprise value, million $ (2)
Equity value, million $
Expected value per share, $ (3)
Source: Analysts Estimates.
Note: (1) Ignores the risk effect in the beta and market risk premium; (2) Ignores the 
allocation of excess cash; (3) Ignores potencial effects of share buybacks.
80,671,9
C
o
m
m
en
ts
26.520,5 29.753,7
6,6 6,6
36.944,5 40.167,6
911,0 739,0
26,6 20,1
5,9 6,0
Base case
Aggressive 
case
1,5 1,1
Scenario
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Outlook 
Given the lack of popular support for the Act with an approval rate of 46% (Bloomberg, 
2018), which is low for a structural reform, even more so considering it is a tax decrease, and 
strong opposition from democrats, as this is viewed as a Republican flagship, practitioners 
have been questioning the sustainability of these tax cuts. Nonetheless, the evidence that a 
35% corporate tax rate is high for a developed economy and the unpopularity of tax raises in 
general, seem to make a plain repeal of the bill unlikely, but should democrats win the 2020 
elections, the Tax Act is likely to be rewritten. Moreover, the OECD has declared the fight 
against base erosion and profit-shifting one of its priorities for the upcoming years, and 
pressures are mounting up on low-tax jurisdictions to revoke certain dispositions. On the 
long-run this could imply a slightly higher effective tax rate than one could assume. 
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